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abstract: This article frames Trump’s politics through a genealogy of propaganda, 
going back to P. T. Barnum and crowd psychologist Gustave Le Bon in the nineteenth 
century and the public relations counsel Edward Bernays in the twentieth. This gene-
alogy shows how propaganda was developed by eager professionals as a tool to gov-
ern the unruly lower classes. Trump’s propaganda presents a break, in that he has not 
only removed professionals from their role mediating the conduct of the lower classes 
for elites, but he has mobilized it as a force against them. His lower- and middle-class 
supporters may not materially benefit from Trump’s form of propaganda, but they get 
psychological benefits, in that they get to vent their ressentiment on the professional class 
and see them too become the targets of propagandistic control. Ultimately, the conflict 
between working-class whites, those without college degrees, and professionals earns 
little for its participants and occludes the role that elites play in class dynamics in the 
United States. This article adds substance and context to the claims that Trump’s appeal 
is antiprofessional while showing that the claims that his supporters are “voting against 
their interests” does not reflect the real psychological benefits many Trumpists get from 
supporting him.
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Before Donald Trump had won his first primary in 2016, his opponents 
had noticed his ability to utterly sop up the media coverage 140 characters 
at a time. Many predicted that the media would lose interest in him and 
he would fall into the background. Timothy Carney voiced this sentiment 
in the early days of the campaign in his Washington Examiner editorial 
“Trump Won’t Blow Up, but He Will Fade Away.”1 Carney and many other 
pundits quickly realized how wrong they were: Trump managed to keep 
himself in the news throughout the election, earning 76.9 percent of all 
Republican candidate mentions in the primary season, followed distantly 
by Jeb Bush at 5.3 percent.2 Even after the election, at one hundred days into 
his presidency, he had received three times more coverage than previous 
presidents.3 Whatever one thinks of how he stays in the limelight, Trump 
exercises a tremendous ability to keep himself there.
Trump’s ability to capture media attention has been honed over decades 
of business dealings. In fact, few popularly know that only a minority of 
the Trump-branded properties and products today are his own: mostly, he 
licenses his name and agrees to do a set amount of promotion in return 
for partial ownership and a share of the profits in others’ endeavors.4 The 
heart of Trump’s business is to promote himself as an ultrasuccessful busi-
nessman so that the Trump brand has cachet and people will pay to license 
it from him. When the public buys Trump-branded water, steaks, neckties, 
or luxury apartments, they are buying the perception of power, wealth, and 
fame that Trump has built around his name. Since his business is based on 
image, propaganda success is real success for him. Trump is a true post-
modern for whom there is no difference between the appearance of success 
and success; this is one reason why he is so sensitive about how his wealth 
and other achievements are counted and popularly perceived.5
Even though it is widely acknowledged that his propaganda skills and 
“media savvy” are responsible for his success, the nature of Trump’s propa-
ganda relationship with the public remains undertheorized.6 Naomi Klein 
has done some of the most thorough work to date, looking at Trump through 
the prism of the rise of megabrands in the 1980s.7 Douglas Kellner has 
also looked at Trump through his work on the concept of the media spec-
tacle, which he developed in the 1990s to help explain “the O.J. Simpson 
murder case and trial, the Clinton sex scandals, and the rise of cable news 
networks.”8 Both of these pieces of work look at Trump through a relatively 
contemporary perspective and see the trends that have shaped his propa-
ganda relationships arising in the last several decades.
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This article will look at Trump through a much longer lens, locating 
Trump through a genealogy of propaganda that begins with circus impre-
sario P. T. Barnum in the nineteenth century, moves through the French 
crowd psychologist Gustave Le Bon and his 1895 text The Crowd, and con-
tinues through the self-proclaimed inventor of public relations, Edward 
Bernays, whose career spanned eighty-two years from 1913 to 1995.9 Using 
this  longer lens, I argue that Trump is not just an extension of the public 
relations and corporate propaganda developed in the twentieth century but 
also a break from it. While modern propaganda was designed as a means 
for a professional class of propagandists to control the public at the behest 
of the wealthy elite that employed them, much of Trump’s propaganda 
relationship is established directly without the mediation of professionals. 
One side effect of Trump’s rejection of the mediation of professionals in 
his propaganda is that without the professionals to make it seem as if his 
every decision is careful and well researched, those communications make 
it clear just how little professional oversight he gets in any area of his polit-
ical career. Trump’s antiprofessionalism, which is communicated in his 
off-the-cuff and unscripted messaging, has shown deep appeal for those 
voters who resent professionals, especially working-class white men and 
those without a college degree. Although Trump does not give the working 
class and those without college degrees a viable path to increasing their 
security and prosperity, he does give them a way to vent their ressentiment 
and revenge themselves upon the most immediate administrators and 
benefactors of their despair, the professional class.
Undoubtedly, antiprofessionalism is not Trump’s only appeal—racism, 
sexism, and transphobia have drawn many to him as well—but this article 
will focus on the antiprofessionalism in Trump’s propaganda. Space neces-
sitates a narrow focus, but in addition, this focus is revealing not just about 
Trump and his “Trumpists” but also about the professional class that is 
likely to make up the primary readership of this article. Based on the gene-
alogy and analysis in this article, I argue that by stoking the enmity between 
professionals and the working class, Trump not only involves professionals 
in a fruitless struggle but also involves them in a battle that sidelines elites’ 
culpability for social problems.
Although most people use the term propaganda very loosely to mean 
nothing more than mass deception, the reality is that it is a fairly narrowly 
defined field, with a small number of professional practitioners, stable 
economic relationships, and a distinctive and well-established discourse 
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and set of practices. Propaganda is not any kind of deceptive speech; it is 
a  specific profession, with its own professional norms, and this article will 
be using it in that sense.10 Propaganda began in the Catholic Church as part 
of its drive to convert non-Catholic populations in the Sacra Congregatio de 
Propaganda Fide (Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith). 
P. T. Barnum adapted some of these techniques for his own use in the nine-
teenth century; he referred to his practice as publicity. In the 1920s, after 
significant changes, propaganda cum publicity was renamed again, “ public 
relations.”11 Although the names “publicity” and “public relations” have 
gained currency, the older term propaganda has never died away and is still 
used. This article will primarily use the term propaganda to refer to this field.
First Point of Inflection: P. T. Barnum
On the surface, the showman, master of humbug, and circus impresario 
Phineas Taylor Barnum seems to mirror President Donald John Trump 
at the onset of the nineteenth century. At points, Barnum’s and Trump’s 
biographies intersect to an astonishing degree—the New York Times, the 
Atlantic, and even Trump’s business associates have commented on it pub-
licly.12 However, it is this personal similarity that brings into relief the stark 
differences in the relationships of propaganda, the public, and politics that 
enmesh the two figures. Barnum never ascended beyond the mayorship of 
Bridgeport and a state congressional seat in Connecticut, although he tried 
several times, yet Trump is president.13 What accounts for the difference in 
their political success?
First, in the nineteenth century reputable businessmen operated busi-
ness relationships on the model of the classical liberal contract: terms were 
deliberated between rational autonomous actors who contracted inde-
pendently and for their own reasons. It was the duty of the opposite party 
in a contract to worry about his own needs, feelings, and concerns; each 
would produce the calculus of his own actions.14 It was considered unmanly 
to entice and arouse the desires of the other through propaganda in order 
to manipulate him into a contract. Propaganda was a feminine endeavor 
in the eyes of nineteenth-century businessmen because it involved cater-
ing to the feelings of others—an attitude that would not popularly change 
until the twentieth century.15 Barnum’s success using publicity made him 
wealthy and famous but also a morally questionable figure.16
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Second, there was no formal set of techniques and no training in the 
art of propaganda. Some people, like Barnum, displayed a talent for it, and 
others had mentors. But the byways for its transmission had little institu-
tional support, and no certifications of skills were widely recognized. Most 
of the discourse on propaganda came from critical sources deriding the 
dishonesty of its practitioners; a set of positive canonical texts had yet to be 
established. It was a marginal practice, and like most marginal practices 
then and today, it lived and disseminated itself in marginal places: crowded 
markets, centers of morally questionable entertainment, freak shows, cir-
cuses, carnivals, and so on.
Third, publicity was a more regional, slower, and less penetrating prac-
tice in Barnum’s time than in Trump’s. High paper prices were one reason. 
Magazines were still something for the well-to-do, and newspapers were 
nowhere near the levels of distribution, number of pages, or frequency that 
they would have in the early twentieth century. Another reason media was 
limited was because of the lack of a technical means to produce a truly 
national media. The Associated Press would not form until 1914 to immedi-
ately and affordably distribute news stories nationally, and wirephoto would 
not be commonly available to transmit images until 1935. By Trump’s time, 
electronic communications would be instantaneous and connect millions, 
but in the early nineteenth century propaganda was a regional means of 
influence.
Although Barnum was perhaps the most successful  nineteenth- century 
publicist to pursue wealth and public office through relentless self- 
promotion, the relationships did not exist that would have made the 
presidency possible for him. Propaganda was too morally suspicious to 
be deeply embraced by reputable people, and the technical aspects of its 
 production left it an expensive and regional pursuit.
Second Point of Inflection: Gustave Le Bon
Gustave Le Bon was not a propagandist but a crowd psychologist who theo-
rized the modern basis of mass psychology and propaganda in his 1895 The 
Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (Psychologie des Foules). Le Bon empha-
sized the scientific nature of his resituation of the knowledge of crowds 
and their government, claiming, “I have endeavored to examine the diffi-
cult problem presented by crowds in a purely scientific manner.”17 Several 
things are important about this.
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First, by systematizing, arranging, and making available the  knowledge 
about “the motives capable of making an impression on [the crowd’s] 
mind,” Le Bon produced a seminal textbook for future propagandists.18 
Propaganda was heretofore the nebulous and marginal art of snake oil 
salesmen, humbug artists, and rabble-rousers. By transforming this dis-
course into systematic information, he made possible the organized trans-
mission of propaganda techniques or, as Le Bon put it, “how these motives 
may be set in action, and by whom they may usefully be turned to practical 
account.”19
Second, Le Bon did more than just systematize those observations and 
techniques that socialists, theater owners, and promoters of “rare curiosi-
ties” had produced to conduct the masses; he legitimated and normalized 
them and their practice by gathering them together under the cloak of the 
social sciences. Medicine and law had a specialized body of knowledge 
whose mastery conferred authority and prestige on its certified recipient. 
A social scientific knowledge of the crowd mind that had been systematized 
in a scientific text opened the door to an effective class of propagandists 
who were morally legitimate professionals; it was no longer just the femi-
nized art of marginal characters but one suitable for the respectable classes 
to work at and employ.20 Propaganda would eventually be taught in the 
university as “public relations” and administered by a class of certified pro-
fessionals.21
Third, Le Bon turned his scientific systematization of propaganda to 
the cause of right-wing elitism. Le Bon was a devoted Orléanist, a royalist 
party that arose after the French Revolution in order to eliminate democ-
racy and restore the duke of Orléans to the throne. Le Bon claimed scientific 
authority in The Crowd for the need of an elite class to employ propaganda 
to subjugate the masses and eliminate the threat they posed: “Today the 
claims of the masses are becoming more and more sharply defined, and 
amount to nothing less than a determination to utterly destroy society as 
it now exists, with a view to making it hark back to that primitive commu-
nism.”22 His psychology was aimed at the French elite to give them the 
tools to govern the crowd and the politics that justified it. This point will be 
important later for understanding Trump: modern propaganda was devel-
oped as a means for a professional class of individuals to govern the lower 
classes in the service of a reactionary elite.
Finally, Le Bon’s philosophy was based on a particularly low view 
of the psychology of the crowd. He argued that the crowd was “always 
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unconscious” and ruled by its deep-seated hereditary racial qualities.23 
His view drew support from the French anthropology of the 1880s and 
claimed that each class in society formed a separate race that had inherited 
“residues of qualities” arising from its evolutionary circumstance.24 Since 
the masses stemmed from peasant stock, they were inherently sheeplike 
and best suited to carrying out simple orders. Moreover, Le Bon argued 
that crowds tended to fall intellectually to the level of the lowest common 
denominator, so that they could all function in unity, and the result of peas-
ant stock operating at its lowest common denominator was “the absence 
of judgment and of the critical spirit, the exaggeration of the sentiments, 
and others besides—which are almost always observed in beings belong-
ing to inferior forms of evolution—in women, savages, and children, for 
instance.”25 In Le Bon the idea was established that the lower classes need 
to be communicated with through a distinctive set of nearly subhuman 
communicative norms due to their evolutionary inferiority and the psychol-
ogy of crowds. It is only the professionals who gain mastery of the science 
of crowds who can communicate in this impoverished language and gov-
ern the masses for the elites.
Third Point of Inflection: Edward Bernays
An important break occurred in the governmental strategy of many large 
American corporations after President Roosevelt used the power of his office 
to intervene in the 1902 anthracite coal strike. With winter approaching 
and coal production still at a standstill, Roosevelt sided with public pressure 
and demanded that coal corporations at least partially concede to union 
demands in order to begin coal production for winter heating. Roosevelt’s 
intervention into private business marked an end to the  laissez-faire poli-
cies of the Gilded Age and put corporations on notice that public opinion 
was an emergent power in American life.26
At least at first, propaganda was not widely tapped as a solution to the 
problem of public opinion. Although there were important developments 
in propaganda prior to World War I, there were very few practitioners, and 
many businesses still remained suspicious of the field as feminized 
and unserious.27 World War I changed both the supply of propagandists 
and business leaders’ attitudes about it: propaganda was widely perceived 
to have been highly effective at transforming a pacifist nation into one with 
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a war will.28 When American businesses were ready to hire propagandists, 
they had a good supply available due to the mass education and training of 
propagandists during the war.
For the newly convinced business elite, propaganda fit the bill as a pri-
vate form of government and, better than the Pinkertons and bribery, it 
elicited less attention from law enforcement, muckraking journalists, and 
the U.S. Congress. The politics of the field, inherited from the French right 
wing, were adaptable to the cause of preserving the control and wealth of 
the American business elite from public interference.
Edward Bernays was an important propaganda standout to emerge fol-
lowing the war. An astute reader of Le Bon, Bernays similarly argued that 
the public was of too low intelligence and too driven by primitive destruc-
tive desires to be allowed to exercise the unfettered power of democracy 
without the invisible guidance of propaganda: “Propaganda will never die 
out. Intelligent men must realize that propaganda is the modern instru-
ment by which they can fight for productive ends and help to bring order 
out of chaos.”29 An essential assumption of the politics of propaganda and 
its raison d’être was the incapacity of the public for democracy and the need 
for elites to assume surreptitious control. In his 1928 Propaganda, Bernays 
wrote in support of the control of propagandists: “It is not usually realized 
how necessary these invisible governors are to the orderly functioning of 
our group life. . . . In practice, if all men had to study for themselves the 
abstruse economic, political, and ethical data involved in every question, 
they would find it impossible to come to a conclusion about anything.”30
Public relations, née propaganda, developed into a multibillion-dollar 
apparatus to govern the moronic masses through an apparatus that shaped 
their conduct on the low discursive level appropriate to their assumed abil-
ities. This discourse relied heavily on images, symbolism, and unconscious 
desire and de-emphasized reasoning and even text: “Trotter and Le Bon con-
cluded that the group mind does not think in the strict sense of the word. 
In place of thoughts it has impulses, habits and emotions. In making up its 
mind its first impulse is usually to follow the example of a trusted leader. . . . 
But when the example of the leader is not at hand and the herd must think 
for itself, it does so by means of cliches, pat words, or images which stand 
in for a whole group of ideas or experiences.”31 Theorists critical of propa-
ganda, such as Neil Postman and even John Dewey, have argued that the 
nature of technological development in the twentieth century was such that 
such a dumbing down of public discourse was inevitable.32 A closer look 
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at the corporate forces transforming public discourse paints a different 
 picture than technological inevitability.33 The history of propaganda points 
to a concerted effort to disenfranchise the public through miring them in 
a subrational discourse that removes them from serious political involve-
ment and grants control to the elite through the ministrations of propa-
ganda professionals.
President Trump
Perhaps Trump’s most defining feature as a businessman, going all the 
way back to his start in Manhattan in 1973, is his interest and proficiency 
in propaganda. His first Manhattan business deal was with Penn Railroad’s 
Victor Palmieri, who said this about him in Barrons: “We interviewed all 
kinds of people who were interested in [our properties], none of whom 
had what seemed like the kind of drive, backing, and imagination that 
would be necessary. Until this young Trump came along. He’s almost a 
throwback to the nineteenth century as a promoter. He’s larger than life.”34 
Propaganda has not only built Trump’s businesses; it saved them as well. 
When his empire went bankrupt for the first time in 1990, his businesses 
never recovered their footing: he had too great a debt to service in order to 
have a healthy balance sheet. In 2004, he was filing for bankruptcy for the 
fifth time when the former producer of the TV show Survivor knocked on 
his door with an idea for a television show called The Apprentice.35 Trump 
became the star of The Apprentice and used the program as a platform for 
propagating his brand. The “reality” disseminated by The Apprentice gave 
Trump greater prestige and wider appeal, which he parleyed into licensing 
deals of his name that saved his businesses and serve as the basis of his 
wealth today.
After his success propagating his brand with Middle America through 
The Apprentice, Trump rolled his public appeal over into the presidency of 
the United States, which has also doubled as a platform to propagate and 
enhance his brand. People who expect him to divest from his investments 
upon the assumption of the presidency do not understand the nature of his 
lifelong business; he is precisely president as an extension and the crowning 
achievement of his brand—it is the last moment at which he would divest.
However talented Trump personally is as a propagandist, he has suc-
ceeded in gaining national office where Barnum failed not just because 
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of his propaganda skill: no one would say that P. T. Barnum was not a 
highly skilled propagandist. Trump succeeded where Barnum failed in part 
because of the transformation of social relationships of propaganda. By 
Trump’s time, propaganda was no longer a feminizing, immoral, or unse-
rious pursuit. Instead, thanks in part to Le Bon and Bernays, its practice 
is considered a reputable, necessary, and professional part of any business 
enterprise. Propaganda is one of the most important ways that elites mobi-
lize the technical skills of professionals in order to regulate the conduct 
of the masses. If Trump has become the kind of person who can be elected 
the president of the United States, it is only because the public has become 
the kind of public who elects people like Trump as the president of the 
United States. The accumulated effect of the constant bombardment of 
simplistic, emotional, symbolic, stereotypical propaganda results not just 
in the development of apparatuses of propaganda but also in altered public 
expectations. Many members of the public were ready and willing to be 
lead through Trump’s media antics, such as his birtherism, name-calling, 
self-aggrandizement, and many bigoted and sexist remarks.36 It is also clear 
that the media were ready and willing accomplices, well trained to enhance 
their ratings by playing to Trump’s propaganda skill and the public’s taste 
for it.
Left at this point, this analysis might seem to agree with the popular 
thesis that Trump’s supporters were “voting against their own interests.” 
After all, propaganda has developed precisely an apparatus to govern the 
public against their own best interests and toward the ends of elites on 
the premise that public interests are destructive to civilization. If this were 
wholly the position of this article (and it is not), then it would place it in 
company with Klein’s and Kellner’s analyses, which too have provided some 
version of this “against their own interests” conclusion. For instance, Klein 
writes on the final page of her volume that “Donald Trump thinks he’ll be 
able to do it again and again—that we will have forgotten by  tomorrow what 
he said yesterday (which he will say he never said); that we will be over-
whelmed by events, and will ultimately scatter, surrender, and let him grab 
whatever he wants.”37 Her picture of the Trump presidency is one in which 
the majority of voters who supported him are simply exploited through his 
presidency.
Except that this narrative fits Trump’s relationship with his publics like 
one of his oversized suits: it is approximately right but off in obvious and 
important respects. It is approximately right that Trump’s working-class 
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white supporters voted “against their own interests” to the extent that they 
have and will continue to suffer material loss under Trump: the attempts to 
repeal the Affordable Care Act, Trump’s wished-for cuts to Social Security, 
the rollback of environmental protections and safety regulations, and 
Trump’s tax plan all materially harm many of his supporters.
Even though the thesis that the public was duped into voting against 
its interests has real resonance and its development is in itself important to 
make, there is nonetheless more to Trump’s propaganda relationship with 
his publics than his exploitation of them. It is not necessary to view the rela-
tionship between Trump and his “Trumpists” as zero-sum, where either 
Trump dupes them into entirely abandoning their interests through pro-
paganda or they “win” by seeing through Trump and entirely abandoning 
his agenda. In fact, the claims that the public was totally duped resemble 
the same kind of elitism that Le Bon and Bernays exercised when they dis-
missed the ability of the American public to meaningfully and productively 
participate in democracy. The “duped” thesis paints Trump supporters as 
passive victims without knowledge of their victimization and with a histor-
ical inability to act on their own behalf.
If his supporters are not total dupes, what do Trumpists get from 
Trump? Trump’s supporters encompass a wide assortment of individuals 
with differing and multiple motivations, and so it will be necessary to focus 
on a specific group and specific motivation in order to draw meaningful 
conclusions. Two groups have been repeatedly singled out as important to 
his candidacy and presidency, and they are the groups most often meant 
when the term Trumpist is used: white lower-class males and individuals 
without college degrees. The working class are those who are above the 
poverty line but earning less than $50,000, while voters without college 
degrees are not defined by any particular income bracket but simply lack a 
degree. For reasons that I will explore later, the reason that Trump’s antago-
nism toward professionals appeals to white male working-class voters also 
translates into his appeal with those who lack a college degree, so my dis-
cussion will focus on the working class and will return to tie in to those 
without a college degree. In short, what Trump offers to his white male 
working-class voters is a way to vent their ressentiment on the professional 
class, which the foregoing genealogy of propaganda can help make clear.38
Others have concluded in a general way that the class tension between 
the working class and professionals is important to Trump’s appeal. CNN’s 
Fareed Zakaria is typically identified as the main proponent of this view, 
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and he recently said, “The election of Donald Trump is really a kind of class 
rebellion against people like us, educated professionals who live in cities, 
who have cosmopolitan views about a lot of things.”39 The conclusion of 
Matthew Continetti in the Washington Free Beacon also summarizes this 
position well: “The GOP was turned upside down by the revolt against the 
professions, and the Democrats are next.”40 The New Yorker has also ana-
lyzed this class dynamic from the opposite side, focusing on professionals’ 
attempts to strike back at Trump and the working class in the article “James 
Comey and the Revenge of Washington’s Professional Class.”41
While popular commentary has grasped something important in the 
dynamic of tension between working-class whites and professionals that 
is fueling Trump, it misses the depth of this dynamic by seeing it only in 
terms of oppositional policies or particular territorial skirmishes. Trump 
does not only oppose the policies many professionals favor and advocate 
policies that infuriate them; he offers the working class a platform to deni-
grate the value of professionals as a whole and to subject them to the same 
forms of propagandistic control to which the working class have been sub-
jected. Put simply, Trump does not just oppose the value of a few beliefs 
of professionals; he holds their value—the value of professionalism and 
professionals—in suspension, and supporting Trump is a way for certain 
publics to flex their own antiprofessionalism. Returning to the genealogy 
of propaganda developed in this article can be helpful in unpacking this 
relationship.
It will be remembered that Le Bon and Bernays, along with a handful 
of others, developed modern propaganda as a means for the elite to reas-
sert control over the public in democratic societies. The theory of public 
subjectivity that propagandists worked from stated that the public was of 
low intelligence, fickle, suggestible, and highly motivated by emotional and 
unconscious impulses. The discursive norms of propaganda drawn from 
this theory of subjectivity demanded that communications be made pictori-
ally, unconsciously, and symbolically to guide the conduct of a moronic pub-
lic through the blunt force of repetition: “The refinements of reason and the 
shadings of emotion cannot reach a considerable public. When an appeal to 
the instincts can be made so powerful as to secure acceptance . . . it can aptly 
be named news.”42 Just as importantly, it was the professional class that 
served as the architects and administrators of this strategy of government.
Trump has created a break in the lineage of the twentieth-century 
model of propaganda. To an unprecedented degree for a U.S. president, 
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Trump has prevented professionals from shaping his propaganda. With 
Trump it is no longer the professionals who are orchestrating the pro-
duction of a propagandistic discourse in service of elite exploitation and 
control. Not only is Trump formulating propagandistic discourse without 
consulting his professionals, but often he uses propaganda—primarily via 
Twitter—to criticize those professionals inside and outside of his adminis-
tration. Trump told the New York Times that, unlike other campaigns that 
proudly listed topflight professional advisers, “he liked to come up with his 
own ideas.”43 Trump has not just taken propaganda from the professionals; 
he has turned it against them.
Jennifer Mercieca, a historian working on Trump, previewed her as 
yet unpublished book for NPR, saying, “Trump’s informal, impulsive style 
goes over well with his supporters. They hear a man who says what he 
thinks, not what consultants think he should say.”44 However, the thrill of 
his propaganda for his white male working-class supporters goes beyond 
the “impulsive style” of Trump’s unsupervised speech that Mercieca noted. 
With the professional consultants out of the way, Trump’s speech is free to 
reveal just how diminished the role of professional consultants is across 
his presidency—a fact that his propaganda professionals have tried to hide 
in the past. While Trump regularly consults “a network of more than two 
dozen fellow billionaires and millionaires,” the traditional role of profes-
sional consultants has been significantly diminished in his administra-
tion.45 The Washington Post reports that “Trump has repeatedly dismissed 
the knowledge and wisdom of experts while elevating non-experts who lack 
relevant experience into important jobs across the federal government.”46 
Removing the professional public relations consultants from his public 
interactions opens a window directly into Trump’s thinking and the nature 
of his advisement. It is not just in his propaganda where he throws off the 
professionals; it is across his administration. To the delight of his white 
male working-class supporters, Trump has made a very visible statement 
against the value of professionals and their government.
The working class know who administers their existence. They see it at 
work in the professionals who create and supervise their work environment; 
they are the same professionals who discipline and fire them. They see it in 
the justice system, where professionals are responsible for apprehending, 
prosecuting, judging, punishing, and supervising offenders. The working 
class see the control professionals exert over them in the “establishment” of 
the political parties, both Democrat and Republican. It is these same parties 
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that have generally turned a deaf ear to lower-class white  problems and 
have presided over forty years of stagnant working-class wages.47 Although 
professionals are typically interacting with the working class under the 
employment and direction of a wealthier and more powerful elite, it is the 
professionals who are often the immediate face of control to the working 
class. Trump’s throwing off of the control of professionals is a kind of liber-
ation that white working-class males can understand.
Furthermore, by removing professionals from the control of his speech 
and policy, Trump has subjected professionals themselves to a kind of con-
trol that is not authored and applied in the ways that they feel comfort-
able with and has diminished their ability to influence or change it. In the 
past, even when an opposing political party took control of Washington, 
professionals could count on their counterparts to be guiding the state 
and the possibility of debate and interchange. The norms of professional 
 discourse—evidence, logical argumentation, debate, and reason—would 
still hold sway, even if the conclusions were not agreed with. Although pro-
paganda was on the surface about elite control, it also allowed professionals 
a deep voice in contemporary business and politics when they projected 
their own values and positions through the cloak of scientifically oriented 
propaganda. In contrast, Trump is no real devotee of education or reason. 
He said this about his education: “Perhaps the most important thing I 
learned at Wharton was not to be overly impressed by academic creden-
tials. . . . The other important thing I got from Wharton was a Wharton 
degree. In my opinion, that degree doesn’t prove very much.”48 Not surpris-
ingly Trump repeatedly emphasizes following his instincts over any kind 
of study: “Again, it’s instincts, not marketing studies.”49 In Trump, the 
working class see the kind of reversal they would like to make: an irratio-
nal and impulsive subject gains ascendency over the planned and ordered 
professionals that seek its control. Propaganda was formulated to contain 
the agency of the lower classes precisely because they were thought to be 
impressionistic, unconsciously driven, emotional, and incapable of intel-
ligent leadership. In a painful reversal, it is precisely the subjectivity that 
propagandists sought to control that now controls them in the person of 
Trump. And looked at through the lens of this genealogy, professionals 
bear responsibility for the creation of a culture opposed to reason and learn-
ing: the professionals propagating a moronic public discourse backed by 
billions of dollars across the entirety of the twentieth century undoubtedly 
impacted discursive norms and contributed to the stultified relations of 
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power growing around them. Moreover, professional propagandists did not 
just largely remove reason from the public discourse surrounding the lower 
classes; they also politicized it and turned it into an armature of administra-
tion and control. Not only did propaganda professionals develop a moronic 
public discourse that eroded public reason, they politicized  reason as a 
class value, making it the enemy of the working class.
Nietzsche once described another relationship of repression reversed—
the one between slaves and their masters in the birth of Christianity. 
Nietzsche argued that the slaves experienced a profound feeling of ressen-
timent toward the masters. Ressentiment is a French word that describes, 
besides resentment, feelings of hatred and jealousy. For Nietzsche, 
Christianity was a vehicle through which slaves’ could vent their feelings of 
ressentiment on their masters. He argued that Christianity taught surrepti-
tiously that it was good to be a slave and so, by spreading Christianity to the 
masters, the slaves’ revenge was to inflict on the masters through another 
route what had been inflicted on them: slavery.50 Likewise, Trump serves 
the working class like Christianity did the slaves: voting for Trump enabled 
the working class to force professionals into the same flat, irrational form 
of political control and hopelessness to which they had been subjected. 
Like Nietzsche’s slaves, who felt themselves unable to escape their slavery 
and so dragged the masters down with them as second best, working-class 
white males have dragged professionals down into the same moronic polit-
ical relations in which they have been mired because they too lack real hope 
of transforming them.
What escape is there for professionals? How can they reply to the work-
ing class or to Trump? Trump’s office reports that they have had to reduce 
hundred-page (professionally generated) reports to single-page reports 
filled with graphs and charts that mention Trump frequently “because he 
keeps reading if he’s mentioned.”51 Trump operates at the level of discourse 
of propaganda, not as a tool employed to control others but as his native 
level of operation. There is no deeper, more rational level at which pro-
fessionals could influence and impact presidential policy by using their 
training and education. The professional values of reason, evidence, and 
objectivity are pushed to the margin in Trump’s White House. For Trump, 
the moronic discourse of propaganda is seemingly the only level at which 
he relates to the world; an astounding number of individuals have sug-
gested to Trump that he take a more measured approach to the presidency 
to no avail.52 With Trump the working class do not end their exploitation 
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and gain control over policy and government, but they are able to impose 
their pain and alienation on the immediate administrators of their own 
unhappiness, the professional class. Trump is a vent for their ressentiment, 
and like Nietzsche’s slaves, they have secured their revenge, not by rising 
up but by dragging their masters down.
This argument also shows why Trump is supported by not just white 
working-class males but also those who lack college degrees. While some 
with college degrees may have greater financial success than those in the 
working class, those without a college education are still not truly profes-
sionals, in the sense that they do not possess the kind of certified techni-
cal knowledge that is typical of professionals. Those without degrees are 
excluded from the cultural capital that accrues to professionals. Even more, 
they are excluded from financial security. The unemployment rate for those 
without a college degree is three times higher than for those who have one, 
and 75 percent of the job recovery following the Great Recession has been 
for positions requiring a bachelor’s degree or higher. While those without a 
college degree may not necessarily fall into the working class, their position 
in the higher economic quintiles is tenuous, and their social position is 
being usurped by those with degrees.53 The avenues to obtaining a college 
degree and professional status are also shrinking. Higher education has 
had its funding slashed per student in both Democratic and Republican 
states.54 Just since the Great Recession, funding has been cut $10 billion for 
public higher education.55 Megan Craig has wondered, with the increasing 
abandonment of public higher education, about the possibility of “corpo-
rate takeovers of universities” (this issue)—much like the Russian oligarchs 
snatched up underfunded post-Soviet public assets. The increasing link-
ing of economic gain and social prestige to the college degree combined 
with its increased cost and hence unavailability fuels ressentiment in those 
excluded from the university toward those that have such benefits. A Pew 
Research survey in July 2017 reports that 58 percent of Republican voters 
now think that, with the exception of job preparation, college is harmful to 
students.56 It is harmful because it makes them into resented professionals.
Of course, the difference between Nietzsche’s slaves and the Trumpists 
is that the slaves revenged themselves upon their masters, while profession-
als are not the masters but just the most proximate representatives of the 
masters. People like Trump are precisely the ones who have  benefited most 
from professionals’ work: the income disparity between the top 1  percent 
of households and the working class has widened to levels not seen since 
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the 1920s.57 The final benefits and control lie in a higher income bracket 
than the professionals occupy. Steven Brence has argued that control 
 cannot be asserted when individuals are “absent awareness of their larger 
consequences,” and in this case, it is not clear that Trump’s  supporters 
understand the full consequences (or lack thereof) of their actions, but 
they do achieve a temporary release of ressentiment, even if they do not gain 
 control.58
The rise of Trump has been fueled by Trumpists’ precariousness and 
economic and social stagnation. It has also been funded by the willing-
ness of the professional class to develop learned discourse as a means of 
elite control. The conflict between the professionals and the working class 
keeps them both from addressing the real concentrations of wealth and 
power in the United States that are fueling their enmity. In the end, the 
professionals who have been so vociferous in their denunciation of Trump 
and brutal in their critiques of his supporters—for instance, as “a basket of 
 deplorables”—are in some ways more dupes and fools than Trump’s own 
supporters. While Trumpists have not and will not make any serious positive 
changes to their social and economic position through Trump, at least they 
have vented their ressentiment and have seen their enemies howl in disbelief 
and rage. Professionals have gotten nothing except further entrenched in a 
pointless battle with those they should be seeking to ally with.
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